Chinese politics in 2024: Indications from the ‘Two Sessions’

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This Explainer looks at the political priorities and preoccupations of the Chinese Communist Party for the rest of 2024 in light of the ‘Two Sessions’ of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference held in early March. It is a companion piece to an Explainer by George Magnus entitled ‘China’s National People’s Congress and the economy: Short change’, which focuses on the economy (find it here).

For a regular year (not one following a Party Congress, when government posts are reshuffled and institutions reshaped), the purpose of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) meetings are fourfold:

To boost national morale by laying out the achievements of the previous 12 months;
To reinforce instructions on important issues and policies for the coming year;
To allow the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to consult widely and take the temperature of the party and people; and,
To pass important legislation.

In recent years the first aim has been harder to balance against the need to maintain some credibility in the face of a worsening economic performance, increasing international tensions and rising social discontent. Yet Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP, has long emphasised the need for ‘positive energy’ (i.e. upbeat assessment). The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) report obliges:

We presented a comprehensive and multifaceted narrative of China’s economy and remained firm and clear about the bright prospects of China’s economy.¹

But the ‘problem pages’ of the NDRC and Ministry of Finance reports show that negative factors still abound.

To decipher the trends, apart from the six main reports² read out and passed at the NPC, it is worth paying attention to the subjects highlighted and remarks made by CCP leaders when they meet the delegations to the NPC and CPPCC (these are largely based on provincial representation, but also include military and sectoral delegations).

In the balance between emphasising the economy or security, some commentators have claimed to detect a swing towards the former at the expense of the latter. But they are two wheels of the same bicycle. The legitimacy of the CCP depends substantially on a growing economy fulfilling the people’s aspirations for ever rising prosperity. Its absence can lead to discontent, protest and instability, which the CCP sees as a threat to ‘political security’ – its hold on power. If the economic wheel meets problems, the bicycle will become unstable and the rider may be thrown.

The party and state ‘penny-farthing’: The reduced importance of the ‘Two Sessions’

To continue the bicycle analogy, Xi’s ‘Chinese Marxism for the 21st century’ resembles a penny-farthing. In a Leninist system, the CCP must always be the large wheel which guides and propels. Xi’s decade of power has seen the party wheel grow mightily at the expense of the State Council or government back wheel.

At this year’s NPC the trend was emphasised by the passing of the Organic Law of the State Council, a measure which defines the State Council’s powers and regulates their performance. But noticeably the first of the four main aspects³ of the revisions read:

The primary political requirement for amending the Organic Law of the State Council is to make it clear that the State Council adheres to the leadership of the Communist Party of China and that the guiding ideology of the party and the country, especially Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, serves as the guiding ideology for all work of the State Council.⁴

This makes it plain that the State Council, its ministries and other bodies are there to implement the CCP’s policies. It is the CCP which makes policy in the various party commissions and leading small groups.

This diminishing State Council role is reflected further in the shorter length of time devoted to the CPPCC and NPC. With minor variations, up until 2020, the CPPCC began on 3rd March, two days before the NPC on 5th March, and the ‘Two Sessions’ generally last between 11 and 14 days. Since Covid-19, the CPPCC has started one day before the NPC and both are complete within eight days (it had always seemed a very long time for senior leaders to devote to occasions where no real policy was made).

The cancelling of the Premier’s press conference also underlines the diminished importance of the ‘Two Sessions’. Meanwhile independence of thought amongst delegates, attenuated though it has always been, continues on a downward trend. This can be seen from the number of votes against or abstentions at the passing of the various reports at the NPC. With the exception of the vote on the Government Work Report (two votes against, three abstentions, compared to none and three respectively in 2023), votes have shown a steady decline over the last six years.

Nevertheless the ‘Two Sessions’ will always retain significance and demand leadership time. It is an integral part of the CCP’s pleonastic ‘whole process people’s democracy’. Time consuming they may be, but no one wants to see Leninism naked.

The ‘big man’ gets even bigger

It might be increasingly hard to believe, but the CCP constitution, article 10.6, ‘proscribes all forms of personality cult’.⁵ Expressions of fealty to Xi seem to have hit new heights at the NPC. The ‘Two Establishes’ [两个确立] and the ‘Two Upholds’ [两个维护] emerged respectively in November 2021 and September 2018. Their overlapping contents bind members to support Xi as the core of the Central Committee and CCP, the unified leadership of the Central Committee, and the guiding role of Xi’s ‘Thought’.⁶ It is usual to see the expressions in documents, but their frequency has been rising, as Xi’s personal control becomes tighter. All members of the Politburo Standing Committee emphasised this dual credo in their meetings with NPC delegations.⁷

The main issues of 2024 as seen from the preoccupations of leaders at the NPC

The future of the economy is always a preoccupation of the ‘Two Sessions’. This Explainer will not go into the detail (it has been well covered by George Magnus in his recent Explainer for the Council on Geostrategy entitled ‘China’s National People’s Congress and the economy: Short change’).⁸

However, talk of a tension between emphasising the economy at the expense of security, which has hitherto been such a feature of Xi’s rule, has been overdone. They are intertwined. The CCP must convince the people that their aspirations of a more prosperous life will continue to be met, that the young will find meaningful employment, and that the PRC’s economy will continue to support increased power and respect on the world stage. Failure to match economic aspirations risks disenchantment and unrest. Social instability is political security, which means the CCP’s survival in power. That is the topmost of the 16 or 20 elements of national security. In that respect the precise % target for gross domestic production growth is unimportant (and might be better understood as gross domestic propaganda).

What Xi speaks about during visits to delegations during the ‘Two Sessions’ gives a good indication of his preoccupations over the coming year. He made three calls: on the Jiangsu delegation, on scientific and technological representatives of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee (one of the eight ‘democratic parties’), and on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).⁹

‘New productive forces’ was the leitmotiv of the ‘Two Sessions’. This phrase heralds less a change of direction than an increase in emphasis. ‘High-quality development’ requires innovation, and to ‘deepen the reform of the science and technology system, the education system, and the talent system, and break through the blockages that restrict the development of new productive forces’.¹⁰ Their importance was reflected by the first two of the ten ‘key tasks’ for 2024 focussing on these areas.¹¹ The aim is to dominate emerging and new industries, as Xi made clear to the Jiangsu delegation.¹² It was a theme which Xi hammered in all three delegation meetings. He has been banging this gong for some years, not least because he sees America’s intent to contain the PRC necessitating ‘self-reliance’, for which domestic innovation is essential. But the force and urgency of his banging is rising. According to Yin Hejun, Minister of Science and Technology, for 2023 research and development expenditure increased 8.1% year-on-year.¹³ The Ministry of Finance budget laid down a 10% increase for 2024.¹⁴

Reinforcement of the ‘Military Civil Fusion policy’ is part of the new productive forces theme. Xi spoke to the PLA about coordinating ‘the development of strategic emerging industries and new combat forces’.¹⁵

Guided by accelerating the supply of new quality combat capabilities, we must deepen the reform of the national defence science and technology industry system, optimise the layout of the defence science and technology industry, improve the agile response and rapid transformation mechanism of advanced technologies, and build an innovation chain, industrial chain, and value chain that is compatible with the development of emerging fields.¹⁶

None of this is surprising, but the tone of urgency reflects where Xi sees the underlying tensions in the PRC’s relations with the United States (US) are leading.

Food security has also long been at the forefront of CCP concerns. It featured heavily in the three main reports of the NPC.¹⁷ The Ministry of Finance announced an increase in spending on ‘stockpiling grain, edible oils, and other materials, up 8.1%’.¹⁸ There was also significant emphasis on legislation to preserve arable land, improving water infrastructure for irrigation and freeing the PRC from dependency on foreign seeds.

Reform and the Third Plenum

Unlike Godot, the wait for the Third Plenum must end this year. The CCP constitution mandates the holding of at least one plenum per year. If there is a norm, the Third Plenum should have taken place in autumn 2023. Some expected it to be held before the NPC, others predict in the first half of 2024. A November date seems more likely. Its importance lies in the expectation of the announcement of significant reform measures, just as its antecedent of 2013. Given that in 2013, Xi himself declared the Chinese economic and social model to be ‘unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable’ and given that reform in the most needed areas has not taken place in the succeeding decade, major reform is certainly needed.¹⁹

Reform was much talked about at the NPC: the word appears 137 times across the three main reports. After the NPC Xi declared:

I have repeatedly emphasised that reform and opening up are crucial tools for contemporary China to catch up with the times. China’s reform will not pause, and its opening-up will not cease. We are planning and implementing a series of significant measures to comprehensively deepen reform, continuously build a first-class business environment characterised by marketisation, rule of law, and internationalisation, and provide broader development opportunities for enterprises from various countries, including those from the United States.²⁰

But it remains to be seen whether substantial flesh can be added to the rhetorical bones. Of the four most crucial areas of reform – fiscal and tax, local and central government relations, state owned enterprises, and hukou [户口] (the PRC’s household registration system)/land reform – there is scant mention and no detail beyond the general statements of the last ten years, much wind but no rain. As the author’s earlier paper sets out, successful economic reform ultimately requires political reform.²¹ But Leninists do not relinquish their grasp on the levers of economic power.

Building a ‘unified national market’ seems set to be the centrepiece of any new push for reform. It received top billing at the ‘Two Sessions’. This should be no surprise. The topic has been on the leadership’s lips for some time, even before the important Central Economic Work Conference in December last year, which ‘proposed to speed up the construction of a unified national market and strive to eliminate various forms of local protection and market segmentation.’²² Shortly afterwards, on December 18th, ‘Premier Li Qiang chaired an executive meeting of the State Council to hear a report on the progress of accelerating the construction of a unified national market.’²³ Li also held a State Council study session on the topic just before the ‘Two Sessions’.²⁴ Assuming that the Third Plenum centres on reform, expect this to be the main measure.

But as ever, reforms are closely interlinked. As an official account of the December State Council meeting reported: ‘Experts interviewed believe that the construction of a unified national market is inseparable from the reform and adjustment of the fiscal and taxation systems’.²⁵ A decade on from fiscal and taxation reform being declared a top priority, progress has been poor.

Regional plans and consolidation of ties between provinces also look to be a key element of reform. This element underpins the unified national market strategy, but it has been going on much longer. Breaking down provincial barriers to promote faster development is what lies behind Xi’s commitment to ‘Jing-Jin-Ji’ (Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei), the Yangtse Economic Basin, the Greater Bay Area, and the Chongqing-Chengdu tie-up. While there is nothing new here at the NPC, Xi will continue to push officials hard to give them more substance.

The curse of anniversaries

The innate difficulty of reform will not be helped by 2024 being the 75th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. There will doubtless be an enormous parade on 1st October, as part of other extensive celebrations (a reason why the Third Plenum might be put back to November). Clearly nothing can be allowed to spoil the party’s party. Yet reform is destabilising at the best of times; and economically, these are not the best of times. Even if they announce reforms at a plenum in late 2024, the likelihood is that the CCP will postpone serious attempts at reform until 2025.

Foreign affairs

International relations are never centre stage at the ‘Two Sessions’. Where they have featured is at the Premier’s press conference, but not this year. Instead, Wang Yi, Politburo member and Foreign Minister, held court. He shed no new light.

If there are any takeaways, they centre on a reminder that relations with the US have returned to the dismal and downward trend line which existed prior to the ‘balloon incident’ and the meeting between Xi and Joe Biden in San Francisco last year. Wang simply could not resist a dig at the expense of the US on most issues. To instance a few:²⁶

An equal multipolar world means equal rights, equal opportunities, and equal rules for every nation;
Certain, or a few powers, should not monopolise international affairs;
No one should impose one single development model onto the whole world;
Unilateralism and protectionism for selfish gains at the expense of others must be discarded;
On all hotspot issues, China always promotes talks for peace. We never add fuel to the fire;
We also urge certain countries outside this region not to make provocations, pick sides, or stir up troubles and problems in the South China Sea;
Anyone trying to use the Korean Peninsula issue to revive the retrogressive Cold War confrontation will be held accountable by history; and,
Some major countries try to bypass the UN and form all sorts of ‘small circles’.

Wang made little attempt to disguise the protagonist with whom the PRC’s behaviour stood in contrast.

The other unsurprising emphasis was the theme of the PRC’s alignment with the non-aligned countries, and supporting the so-called ‘Global South’ and developing countries. Thus, the various initiatives which underpin the CCP’s foreign policy received due – or perhaps undue – mention, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilisation Initiative. It is worth noting that the newcomer on the block, the Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative, although not mentioned at the NPC, was included in the joint statement signed by the PRC and Angola a few days later on 15th March.²⁷ It would not surprise to see this last subsumed in a wider Global Technology Initiative.

Conclusion

This was a lacklustre edition of the ‘Two Sessions’. It turned tighter by one more notch the control of the CCP over governance. It underlined the main policies stressed at the Central Economic Work Conference of December last year. It paid obeisance to the idea of reform, but gave little indication that the party will – or can – tackle the main challenges facing the PRC, or indeed when.

For foreign countries the takeaways are similarly lacklustre. Increased CCP control brings no confidence that dealing with the PRC, whether on the governmental or business plane, will be any easier. Chinese decoupling, which predates that of the US and its allies, will continue at the best pace which realities allow. Promises of more economic reform and opening up wear thin without concrete evidence of genuine change. The case that the Third Plenum will provide such evidence in the autumn is by no means sure. In the 75th anniversary year of the founding of the PRC, Xi will not risk upsetting the celebratory applecart in Taiwan, the South China Sea or other regions. But neither is he likely to provide free and open countries with cause to celebrate détente.

Appendix 1: Key priorities of the 2024 NPC

The National Development and Reform Commission plan for 2024

1. Using scientific and technological innovation to lead the modernisation of the industrial system and moving faster to develop new quality productive forces.

2. Boosting domestic demand and better leveraging the basic role of consumption and the critical role of investment.

3. Remaining firmly committed to deepening reform and building a high-standard socialist market economy.

4. Continuing to develop new systems for a higher-standard open economy and injecting greater energy and vitality into domestic and international economic flows.

5. Vigorously and effectively advancing rural revitalisation across the board and accelerating the modernisation of agriculture and rural areas.

6. Advancing coordinated regional development and new urbanisation and improving regional economic layout.

7. Making further progress in ecological conservation and promoting green, low-carbon development to build a ‘Beautiful China’ more rapidly.

8. Better preventing and controlling major economic and financial risks to effectively forestall systemic risks.

9. Building up security capacity in key areas and safeguarding economic security.

10. Taking concrete steps to ensure and improve the people’s wellbeing and living standards.

Government Work Report (headings for the 2023 report are italicised)

1. Striving to modernise the industrial system and developing new quality productive forces at a faster pace.
(2. Accelerating the modernisation of the industrial system).

2. Invigorating China through science and education and consolidating the foundations for high-quality development.

3. Expanding domestic demand and promoting sound economic flows.
(1. Expanding domestic demand).

4. Continuing to deepen reform and boosting internal momentum for development.
(3. Unswervingly consolidating and developing the public sector and unswervingly encouraging, supporting, and guiding the development of the non-public sector).

5. Pursuing higher-standard opening up and promoting mutual benefits.
(4. Intensifying efforts to attract and utilise foreign investment).

6. Ensuring both development and security and effectively preventing and defusing risks in key areas.
(5. Effectively preventing and defusing major economic and financial risks).

7. Making sustained efforts to deliver in work relating to agriculture, rural areas, and rural residents and taking solid steps to advance rural revitalisation.
(6. Stabilising grain output and advancing rural revitalisation).

8. Promoting integrated development between urban and rural areas, advancing coordinated development between regions, and optimising regional economic layout.

9. Enhancing ecological conservation and promoting green and low-carbon development.
(7. Continuing the transition to green development).

10. Ensuring and improving the people’s wellbeing and promoting better and new ways of conducting social governance.
(8. Meeting people’s basic living needs and developing social programmes).

About the author

Charles Parton is a James Cook Associate Fellow in Indo-Pacific Geopolitics at the Council on Geostrategy. He spent 22 years of his 37-year diplomatic career working in or on China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. In his final posting he was seconded to the European Union’s Delegation in Beijing, where, as First Counsellor until late 2016, he focussed on Chinese politics and internal developments, and advised the European Union and its Member States on how China’s politics might affect their interests. In 2017, he was chosen as the Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s Special Adviser on China. He is currently a fellow at Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS).

Disclaimer

This publication should not be considered in any way to constitute advice. It is for knowledge and educational purposes only. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Council on Geostrategy or the views of its Advisory Council.

No. GPPE05 | ISBN: 978-1-914441-64-6

Embedded image credit: World Economic Forum (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 DEED cropped and overlaid)

1
‘Report on the Implementation of the 2023 Plan for National Economic and Social Development and on the 2024 Draft Plan for National Economic and Social Development’, National Development and Reform Commission (PRC), 05/03/2024, http://english.scio.gov.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024), p. 3.
2
These are the Premier’s Government Work Report; the National Development and Reform Commission’s report on the plans for national economic and social development; the Ministry of Finance’s budget report; the Supreme People’s Court report; the Supreme People’s procurate report; and the NPC Standing Committee report on the work of the NPC. All reports review the past year and set out plans for the coming 12 months.
3
‘十四届全国人大二次会议举行新闻发布会大会发言人娄勤俭答中外记者问’ [‘The second session of the 14th National People’s Congress: Conference spokesperson Lou Qinjian answered questions from domestic and foreign reporters’], Press Centre for the Second Session of the Fourteenth National People’s Congress, 04/03/2024, http://www.npc.gov.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
4
‘关于《中华人民共和国国务院组织法（修订草案）》的说明’ [‘Explanation on the “Organic Law of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (Revised Draft)”’], 国防部 [National Defence Ministry (PRC)], 05/03/2024, http://www.mod.gov.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
5
‘Constitution of Communist Party of China’, State Council (PRC), 22/10/2022, http://english.www.gov.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
6
For the ‘Two Upholds’, see: ‘Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century’, State Council (PRC), 16/11/2021, https://english.www.gov.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024). For the ‘Two Establishes’, see: ‘中共中央政治局召开会议习近平主持’ [‘The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting chaired by Xi Jinping’], 新华社 [Xinhua], 21/09/2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
7
For Li Qiang, see: ‘李强在参加云南代表团审议时强调充分发挥优势彰显特色更好融入国家区域协调发展大局’ [‘Li Qiang emphasised when participating in the deliberation of the Yunnan delegation: Give full play to advantages and highlight characteristics to better integrate into the overall coordinated development of national and regional areas’], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], 06/03/2024, http://paper.people.com.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024). For Wang Huning, see: ‘王沪宁在参加贵州代表团审议时强调全面贯彻落实党中央决策部署奋发有为推进中国式现代化’ [‘Wang Huning emphasised when participating in the deliberation of the Guizhou delegation: Comprehensively implement the decisions and arrangements of the Party Central Committee and work hard to promote Chinese-style modernisation’], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], 06/03/2024, http://paper.people.com.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024). For the People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police leaders, see: ‘解放军和武警部队代表团分组审议政府工作报告’ [‘People’s Liberation Army and Armed Police Force delegations discuss the government work report in groups’], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], 06/03/2024, http://paper.people.com.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
8
George Magnus, ‘China’s National People’s Congress and the economy: Short change’, Council on Geostrategy, 11/03/2024, https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
9
‘习近平总书记金句’ [‘General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Golden Words’], 人民日报两会特刊 [People’s Daily ‘Two Sessions’ Special Edition], 08/03/2024, http://paper.people.com.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
10
Ibid.
11
See: Appendix 1
12
‘习近平在参加江苏代表团审议时强调因地制宜发展新质生产力’ [‘Xi Jinping emphasised when participating in the deliberation of the Jiangsu delegation: Develop new productive forces in accordance with local conditions’], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], 06/03/2024, http://paper.people.com.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
13
‘China’s R&D expenditure exceeds 3.3 trln yuan in 2023: minister’, People’s Daily, 05/03/2024, http://en.people.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
14
‘Report on the Execution of the Central and Local Budgets for 2023 and on the Draft Central and Local Budgets for 2024’, Ministry of Finance (PRC), 05/03/2024, http://english.scio.gov.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024), p. 31.
15
‘习近平总书记金句’ [‘General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Golden Words’], 人民日报两会特刊 [People’s Daily ‘Two Sessions’ Special Edition], 08/03/2024, http://paper.people.com.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
16
Ibid.
17
See, for example: ‘Report on the Implementation of the 2023 Plan for National Economic and Social Development and on the 2024 Draft Plan for National Economic and Social Development’, National Development and Reform Commission (PRC), 05/03/2024, http://english.scio.gov.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024), pp. 64-65.
18
‘Report on the Execution of the Central and Local Budgets for 2023 and on the Draft Central and Local Budgets for 2024’, Ministry of Finance (PRC), 05/03/2024, http://english.scio.gov.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024), p. 31.
19
Charles Parton, ‘Plateau China: Reform in the ten years after the Third Plenum of 2013’, Council on Geostrategy, 09/11/2023, https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
20
‘习近平会见美国工商界和战略学术界代表’ [‘Xi Jinping meets with representatives from the US business community and strategic academia’], 新华社 [Xinhua], 27/03/2024, http://www.news.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
21
Charles Parton, ‘Plateau China: Reform in the ten years after the Third Plenum of 2013’, Council on Geostrategy, 09/11/2023, https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
22
‘国务院常务会再提加快建设全国统一大市场, 强调财税等领域改革’ [‘The State Council executive meeting once again mentioned accelerating the construction of a unified national market and emphasised reforms in finance and taxation and other fields’], 国务院 [State Council (PRC)], 19/12/2023, https://www.gov.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
23
Ibid.
24
‘李强主持国务院第六次专题学习’ [‘Li Qiang presided over the sixth special study session of the State Council’], 国务院 [State Council (PRC)], 26/02/2024, https://www.gov.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
25
‘国务院常务会再提加快建设全国统一大市场，强调财税等领域改革’ [‘The State Council executive meeting once again mentioned accelerating the construction of a unified national market and emphasised reforms in finance and taxation and other fields’], 国务院 [State Council (PRC)], 19/12/2023, https://www.gov.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
26
‘Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC), 07/03/2024, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024).
27
‘中华人民共和国和安哥拉共和国关于建立全面战略合作伙伴关系的联合声明’ [‘Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Angola on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership’], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], 16/03/2024, http://paper.people.com.cn/ (checked: 15/04/2024).