Executive summary
- The organisational and cultural structures of the United Kingdom’s (UK) defence architecture arbitrarily separate nuclear and conventional forces into silos. This limits the ability of British decision-makers to generate greater synergies between nuclear and conventional deterrence.
- This siloing is made even more challenging due to hollowed-out conventional forces and a minimalist nuclear deterrence posture. This combination of factors undermines the UK’s ability to deter adversaries.
- Options to help rebuild deeper synergies between conventional and nuclear forces include integrating nuclear and conventional planning; reconstituting strike and denial capabilities; and deepening interoperability with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies, especially in Europe.
About the author
Matthew Palmer is an Adjunct Fellow at the Council on Geostrategy and a former British Army officer with deployed operational experience in the Middle East and Europe, including working on Operation SHADER and in the JEF. His areas of interest include irregular and sub-threshold warfare, force structure, and joint operations.
Disclaimer
This publication should not be considered in any way to constitute advice. It is for knowledge and educational purposes only. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Council on Geostrategy or the views of its Advisory Council.
Image credit: Nuclear submarine HMS Vanguard passes HMS Dragon as she returns to HMNB Clyde, Scotland, CPOA (Phot.) Tam McDonald, Open Government Licence
No. 2026/01| ISBN: 978-1-917893-17-6