The trilateral initiative: A minilateral to catalyse Russia’s defeat?

Executive summary

• Ukraine is at a critical moment. Victory is possible but there is no clear strategy to secure a Russian defeat.
• Although the United Kingdom (UK) has been on the front-foot, other allies, particularly Germany and the United States (US), have feared that the Kremlin may escalate by using nuclear weapons or attacking a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) ally. They have also favoured NATO cohesion more than a Ukrainian victory.
• Russia will not relent. A Russian victory is still possible. It can take many forms, from the seizure of Kyiv to the ‘freezing’ of the conflict while retaining lands captured since February 2022.
• There should be no uncertainty: a Russian victory would open Pandora’s box in Europe (and globally), emboldening the Kremlin, endangering NATO unity as countries such as Poland do more to secure themselves, and giving ammunition to the perspective that ‘might makes right’.
• The economic consequences would also be severe, especially for the UK. The missions to deliver economic growth and Net Zero – ‘securonomics’ – would be jeopardised, not least because Britain would be forced to invest a significantly higher proportion of its national income into defence to meet the reinvigorated and growing threat from Russia.
• With administrations in Germany, France and the US looking increasingly insular and irresolute, the new government in Britain, backed by a large majority, has the opportunity to maximise its authority in Europe by pushing for an agreed, clear path to victory.
• On taking office, the new British government should embrace a phase of disruptive, creative, and dynamic British leadership involving the use of minilateralism.
• This ‘neo-Bevinite’ approach would focus on rekindling the so-called ‘trilateral initiative’ formed between Britain, Poland and Ukraine in early February 2022 as the centrepiece – the ‘Three Eyes’ – for forging a broader coalition to underwrite NATO and secure Ukraine’s victory. This should involve:
  • Identifying with Ukraine the path to victory while taking measures to resist the Kremlin’s reflexive control by pushing back against escalation fears in other NATO allies;
  • The mobilisation of Britain’s innovative defence and dual-use sectors in a co-ordinated project with Ukraine and Poland to deliver victory;
  • The provision of Ukraine with an array of longer-range, uncrewed systems to enable mass, targeted campaigns to strike Russian military, communications and logistical targets along the frontier zones. The objective should be to dislocate the Russian offensive against Ukraine from the rear, where it is weakest and most vulnerable;
  • Pushing for additional deliveries of armoured vehicles and artillery to Ukraine from other allies;
  • Supplemental measures to divert Russian attention in the Baltic and harden potential targets – especially Moldova – in the Black Sea region;
  • A campaign of economic and political warfare against Russia to grind down the Russian war machine and reduce the Kremlin’s influence in so-called ‘middle ground’ countries, not least in Africa, South America, and elsewhere.
• If Britain can succeed, not only would it reconnect London to European allies and partners, but it would also demonstrate, decisively, the new government’s emerging doctrine of ‘progressive realism’.