Forewords
Space captures the public imagination and the spirit of the United Kingdom (UK). It is fundamental to society, the backbone of our economy, a catalyst for growth, and vital for our national security and defence. But threats and risks to our vital national interests in space are rising.
Over the past decade, the number of satellites in orbit has nearly quadrupled. Once, our Space Domain Awareness capabilities struggled to monitor 3,000 objects; today there are over 11,000, with forecasts of up to 60,000 by 2030. Moreover, there is now a considerable adversary counter-space arsenal on orbit – ready, rehearsed and operational.
UK Space Command’s mission is to protect and defend our vital interests in space, and enable the British Armed Forces to operate globally. To achieve this, we require credible capability to deter and, if necessary, to be postured and prepared to fight and win the battle above.
Accordingly, over the past year alone, we have increased our operational purchase, launched Britain’s first military satellite in over a decade, opened the National Space Operations Centre, and invested hundreds of millions of pounds in space capabilities and integration. Moreover, the 2025 Strategic Defence Review raises space to parity with the traditional domains and makes recommendations to invest in the domain.
Yet, capability is only half the battle. The intellectual foundation for thinking about space power remains thin. Unlike other domains, there is no established corpus of theory to draw upon. As a result, technological development is racing ahead of conceptual understanding. If we are to act with confidence and coherence in this domain, we must also strengthen our thinking – developing the frameworks, doctrines and strategic literacy which underpin effective space policy.
That is why this Report by the Council on Geostrategy is so valuable. It contributes to the essential work of building a British school of thought on space power: how we understand our interests, define control, and conceptualise deterrence in orbit. The study of space control – how to ensure freedom of action for the UK and our allies and partners while constraining the options of adversaries – is not just an academic exercise; it is an urgent national imperative.
Maj. Gen. Paul Tedman CBE
Commander, UK Space Command
A succession of His Majesty’s (HM) Government reviews in 2025 across the defence and civil domains held up against the backdrop of international geopolitical turmoil have cast Britain’s current space strategy into sharp relief. Is the National Space Strategy up to the job? What is it trying to achieve in terms of space power?
The UK has a highly capable – arguably world class – industrial and academic space sector, which has increasingly been placed at risk following recent spending reviews. The case for investment and government intervention is less compelling when the sector’s strategic aims do not appear to align with the national context. We have excellent people in government working in the space sector, but our strategic vision is, by necessity, developed in departmental silos.
The methodological approach proposed herein could, and should, be adopted across HM Government under a ‘one-government’ approach to space strategy. The British space sector is facing existential challenges in the next few years. A methodology for a space strategy via a rigorous and systematic analysis of national space interests is welcomed by industry. A clear, stable, coherent strategy and subsequent coordinated delivery, in partnership with the space sector, will accelerate corporate and private equity investment into the sector and enhance the UK’s international position as a space power.
Without clarity of purpose, we will miss the substantial opportunity the space sector offers to Britain. I don’t think any of us want that.
Doug Liddle
Chair, UKspace
Professor in Practice, Surrey Space Institute
Executive summary
Context:
- The United Kingdom (UK) lacks a clear and comprehensive understanding of its interests in the space domain. This prevents a thorough examination and acceptance of the full scope of the space domain and its potential to benefit British national power.
- There is also a lack of a substantive theoretical apparatus for space power, and of methodological approaches for strategy making in this field. One consequence of this is that British space strategy is not actually ‘strategic’.
Questions this Report addresses:
- What is the UK’s national space interest?
- What kind of national space power might Britain choose to pursue?
- What methodology might be applied to the process of UK space strategy making?
Key findings:
- The enduring British national space interest is the increase of the UK’s space power. The latter is also the principal aim of space strategy, in line with Prof. Sir Lawrence Freedman’s definition of strategy as ‘the art of creating power’.
- The elements of national space power are revealed analytically through a space version of the classic ‘DIME’ framework:
- Diplomatic: Bilateral, multilateral and international cooperation, and engagement on space affairs;
- Informational: National space narrative, international prestige and hard information advantage through orbital intelligence;
- Military: Support to terrestrial operations, space security and space warfare capabilities; and
- Economic: Space infrastructure, the industrial ecosystem and the science base.
- The main grand-strategic options for the kind of national space power Britain might choose to pursue can be summarised in a ‘Positional paradigm’ framework of four separate views of space power, according to the priority ranking of space in His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s overall strategy:
- The adjunct view: Space is seen as a supplementary activity, which supports and enhances terrestrial services and life on Earth;
- The advantage view: Space is recognised as a relevant factor in geostrategic and even economic-technological competition, but still as a subordinate source of leverage and a niche advantage;
- The ascendancy view: Space power is admitted in government thinking as a standalone, co-equal factor in strategic competition alongside all other main elements of power; and
- The apex view: The theoretical upper band of space power ambition and application, where space is understood as one of the fundamental pillars of national power.
- The global context to which space strategy must respond should be analysed through a ‘Competitive Operational Capability’ framework on Net Assessment principles, focused on the space power balances across four functional categories:
- Logistics: Launch infrastructure and cadence; in-space movement and propulsion; Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO); and In-Space Assembly and Manufacturing (ISAM);
- Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C3ISR): Sensing and Earth Orbit (EO); Space Domain Awareness (SDA); connectivity and communications; and Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT);
- Counterspace: Kinetic Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons; non-kinetic Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs); Electronic Warfare (EW); and cyber capabilities; and
- Exploration: Human spaceflight platforms; robotic probes and rovers; scientific instruments and payloads; and deep space mission technologies.
Recommendations:
In order to develop an effective methodological approach to space strategy, HM Government should:
- Adopt an ‘ends-ways-means’ methodology based on cross-correlating the three frameworks identified in this Report, where:
- Space DIME analysis identifies the elements of national space power;
- These elements determine the paradigm in which national space strategy operates, which requires a certain capability mix to compete effectively; and
- The development of operational capabilities shapes the elements of space power, which feed back into the DIME framework – thus closing the strategy cycle.
- Consider three further suggestions, alongside offering the above methodology as the main recommendation to policymakers:
- Create a Space Net Assessment capability within government;
- Adopt the concept of ‘national space interests’ in official doctrine formally; and
- Prioritise human space exploration for its disproportionate positive impact on space power development.
About the author
Gabriel Elefteriu FRAeS is Senior Research Fellow in Space Power at the Council on Geostrategy, where he co-leads the Strategic Defence Unit. Previously, he was Director of Research and Strategy and a member of the Senior Management Team at Policy Exchange, where he also founded and directed the first dedicated Space Policy Research Unit in the UK. He is an Associate of King’s College London, an elected Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society and a founding partner at AstroAnalytica, a space consultancy.
Disclaimer
This publication should not be considered in any way to constitute advice. It is for knowledge and educational purposes only. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Council on Geostrategy or the views of its Advisory Council.
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No. 2025/23 | ISBN: 978-1-917893-12-1