Crises and challenges in the First Island Chain: A British response

Executive summary

• The First Island Chain remains a potential source of global conflict. His Majesty’s (HM) Government’s 2023 Integrated Review Refresh highlighted the PRC’s more aggressive stance in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, and committed the United Kingdom (UK) to supporting stability in these two areas. Yet questions remain over how it can achieve this, and in doing so, secure British interests.
• Any unilateral Chinese attempt to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait would go against the UK’s long-standing expectation that cross-strait differences would be settled peacefully. Such a change would see Taiwan – a vibrant democracy – annexed and the regional order upturned. Further to this, instability around Taiwan would also be detrimental to the global economy.
• HM Government strongly opposes activities which would elevate tensions in the South China Sea and is committed to upholding the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Freedom for all parties to navigate there is ‘vital’ to British, and global prosperity.
• An effective British response to future crises and challenges in the so-called ‘First Island Chain’ depends on continued United States (US) leadership in the region, and the willingness of those on the frontline of Beijing’s revisionism – Taiwan and other South China Sea claimants – to resist.
• HM Government possesses one of the largest diplomatic networks and enjoys membership of key international groupings. Drawing on these extensive ties, the UK could convene partners and coordinate actions in response to challenges or crises in the First Island Chain.
• HM Government boasts of its ‘formidable’ sanctions capabilities, and has  used them against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. In response to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) revisionism, the UK could, alongside partners, implement a range of sanctions depending on the desired outcome.
• Britain will enhance its posture across the Indo-Pacific over the coming decade. In addition to bolstering deterrence, and failing this engaging in conflict, British military capabilities could also support other objectives such as aiding like-minded countries’ maritime capacity building efforts.
• The PRC could impose a  ‘quarantine’ around Taiwan if it wished to resolve or expedite its territorial claims. At the less intense end of the spectrum is an ‘inspection zone’, while at the other end would be a full blockade which would attempt to prevent goods and people from entering and exiting Taiwan.
• Beijing’s end goal appears to be control and dominance over the South China Sea. As it works towards this end, the PRC could attempt to build additional islands there, establish new Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZs) or declare new ‘straight baselines’ around existing geographical features.
• In response, HM Government should:
  • Continue to define the PRC as an ‘epoch defining systemic challenge.’ Accordingly, preventing the PRC from transforming the international system to its advantage, and Britain’s disadvantage, should be the overarching goal emerging from the current audit of the UK’s policy in relation to the PRC.
  • Recognise in the Strategic Defence Review the centrality of the Indo-Pacific, the region at the heart of this epoch defining struggle, and should apportion the corresponding resources to it. Allocating resources beyond Europe would not run counter to a ‘North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) first’ approach to defence, but be consistent with the trajectory the alliance is on.
  • Shape NATO’s strategic thinking in terms of the PRC’s subversion of the free and open international order, particularly its efforts in the maritime Indo-Pacific.
  • Lead efforts to shape the rules and norms in the First Island Chain. To achieve this, Britain should continue to push for wider acceptance of UNCLOS, engage in maritime capacity building efforts and maintain offshore patrol vessels in the Indo-Pacific.
  • Generate a clear narrative to justify opposition to potential unilateral changes to the Taiwan Strait to counter Beijing’s efforts to present the matter as an ‘internal affair.’ Rebuttals should be firm and done well in advance of a crisis.
  • Demonstrate British willingness to inflict a severe cost on the PRC for crossing certain geopolitical redlines. This includes demonstrating the ability to run, and sustaining the running of, a blockade of Taiwan.
  • Find agreement among allied and partner countries to implement swift and unified economic sanctions in response to lower-level PRC revisionism both in the South China Sea and across the Taiwan Strait.
  • Commit to sending the Carrier Strike Group to the Indo-Pacific on a regular basis – ‘pulsing’ – following its 2025 visit and work with an array of European countries to ensure a coordinated and persistent European presence in the First Island Chain.
  • Address Britain’s vulnerability to coercion from Beijing by reducing the UK’s dependency on the PRC for critical goods by diversifying supply chains.
  • Draw together Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific allies and partners and align them behind a shared understanding of the indivisibility of the two regions.