Prime Minister Liz Truss: AUKUS and relations with Washington

The election of a new prime minister inevitably raises questions as to his or her relations with the United States (US), and this is certainly the case with Liz Truss, the United Kingdom’s (UK) recently appointed leader. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is not an agreement on how 10 Downing Street will interact with the White House under her leadership. The Financial Times reported that as Foreign Secretary, Truss questioned the ‘special relationship’ and rhetorically asked what London had received lately in benefits from the partnership. Politico suggested that there, unsurprisingly, was a lack of consensus in America regarding Truss; some Democrats distrust her due to her support for Brexit, while some conservative Republican allies back her, likely due to her Thatcherite policies.

While the contours of the relationship between Joe Biden, the American President, and Truss remain to be seen, it is important to recognise that the relationship between the UK and US is about a lot more than the political inclinations of those who occupy the White House and 10 Downing Street. To be sure, the amount of political energy each invests into the partnership should define the relationship’s boundaries, and this becomes easier when the two mostly see eye-to-eye. But the partnership goes beyond this dynamic. 

Largely superficial rhetoric around shared values, shared history, and a shared culture are certainly part of the often cliched ‘special relationship’ between the UK and the US. Yet, the relationship at its core is more predicated on shared interests, particularly in the present geopolitical environment. Russia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine has reaffirmed the importance of Euro-Atlantic unity, even as Washington (and to a lesser degree, London) seeks to focus more on the Indo-Pacific. 

Below the political level, the working or operational-level relationship between the UK and US is and should remain exceptionally strong. The importance of intelligence sharing within the Five Eyes, but specifically amongst Washington and London, is recognised as having supreme importance and will unlikely be affected by Truss’ entry into 10 Downing Street. Equally, the military relationship is perhaps the closest between two countries at any point in history; the UK suffered the second highest number of casualties in Afghanistan – a sacrifice that will not be forgotten, regardless of the politics surrounding the war and its aftermath – and both have acted in unison in providing support for Ukraine and punishing the Kremlin for its illegal act of aggression.

Perhaps the most significant evidence of the confluence of interests and operational policy is seen through the AUKUS agreement between the UK, US and Australia. While more of an ‘additive, focused security partnership’ than a new alliance in and of itself, AUKUS deepens already strong ties between the three countries and expands cooperation in critical defence areas. This is not an insignificant development. All three countries will coordinate and share research in areas critical to future military technology and national power, such as machine learning, artificial intelligence, and cyber-attack defences. 

The level of trust needed for the functioning of the AUKUS agreement represents an attempt to future-proof the relationship. To be sure, political leaders on either side of the Atlantic can adjust the terms of these agreements, but their very existence represents a deepening of the relationship regarding practical strategic interests.

Most notably, under AUKUS, the US will share nuclear propulsion technology with Australia – it has only ever done so previously with the UK. Ben Wallace, Britain’s Secretary of Defence, recently announced that Australian submariners will sail aboard the HMS Anson and three other Astute-class nuclear submarines to train in this technology, something which is foreign to the Royal Australian Navy. This paves the way for potentially joint-crewed submarines operating in the Indo-Pacific, a significant development particularly in terms of deterrence; an adversary must risk going to war with two AUKUS partners or potentially all three if they are to attack a jointly crewed submarine.

The deepening of bi- and tri-lateral ties through AUKUS would not have occurred in a vacuum or in the absence of both a shared sense of ‘culture’ and ‘values’, but it is largely driven by shared strategic interests. Arguably, and most poignantly, the intelligence sharing relationship that led to the creation of the Five Eyes, and recent developments such as the creation of AUKUS, occurred first out of mutual strategic interest, not normative similarities. Indeed, during the early days of intelligence sharing in the Second World War, both the UK and the US were deeply suspicious of each other’s intentions – something often forgotten. Shared language and common history was not enough; the partnership was driven by mutual strategic interests – interests which eventually overcame those initial suspicions – in breaking the ciphers of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. 

The level of trust needed for the functioning of the AUKUS agreement represents an attempt to future-proof the relationship. To be sure, political leaders on either side of the Atlantic can adjust the terms of these agreements, but their very existence represents a deepening of the relationship regarding practical strategic interests. The more layers of connectivity between Washington and London, the more beneficial the relationship is to either party and the more likely it is to survive the ebbs and flows of partisan politics. Indeed, while Donald Trump, former American President, strained the relationship perhaps to its most extreme point in modern history, in practical terms shared strategic interests triumphed and the partnership was further strengthened after he departed the White House. 

Approaching the bilateral relationship through the lens of shared strategic interests and not normative similarities wrapped in empty rhetoric should set both the UK and US up for success.

This is not to say that there will not be areas of friction between Washington and London. There likely will be. But those frictions and the political capital and will invested into them comprise of but a fraction of what makes up the relationship. There is far more going on below the surface. 

Will the resolution of the Northern Ireland Protocol and Brexit be a concern for the White House? Certainly. Evidence of this is already apparent in the readouts of the first call between Biden and Truss: 10 Downing Street said the two ‘agreed on the importance of protecting the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement’, while the White House wrote that they ‘discussed their shared commitment to protecting the gains of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and the importance of reaching a negotiated agreement with the European Union on the Northern Ireland Protocol.’ The Northern Ireland Protocol is certainly important. It is, however, only one piece of the complex mosaic of agreements and relationships that go beyond the superficial clichés wielded by policymakers and journalists in both countries regarding the UK-US relationship.

Approaching the bilateral relationship through the lens of shared strategic interests and not normative similarities wrapped in empty rhetoric should set both the UK and US up for success. This is of paramount importance as both enter periods of strained economics and potential political disruption. The partnership is and has always been about more than values or language, and more about strategic national interests, with the former helping to shape the latter. In this geopolitical environment, it is vital that strategic sense and the national interests define the relationship between the UK and US.

Joshua Huminski is the Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress.